This paper investigates the effect of changes in state prudent trust investment laws on asset allocation in noncommercial trusts. The old prudent man rule favored "safe" investments and disfavored "speculation" in stock. The new prudent investor rule directs trustees to craft an investment portfolio that fits the risk tolerance of the beneficiaries and the purpose of the trust. Using state-and institution-level panel data from 1986 through 1997, we find that after adoption of the new prudent investor rule, institutional trustees held about 1.5 to 4.5 percentage points more stock at the expense of "safe" investments. Our findings explain roughly 15 to 30 percent of the overall increase in stock holdings in the period studied. We attribute most of the remaining increase to stock market appreciation. We conclude that, even though trust fiduciary laws are nominally default rules, institutional trustees are nonetheless sensitive to changes in those rules.
I. INTRODUCTION
"How do you make a small fortune? Give a bank a large one to manage in trust" (Dukenminier and Krier 2003, p. 1335) . So goes an old saw about the banking industry that reflects long experience with risk-averse, conservative trust investing by institutional trustees operating under the prudent man rule of trust investment law. The prudent man rule favored "safe" investments such as government bonds, disfavored "speculation" in stock, and courts assessed the prudence of each investment in isolation rather than in the context of the portfolio as a whole. In the last twenty years, however, all states have replaced the old prudent man rule with the new prudent investor rule. Drawing on the teachings of modern portfolio theory, the new prudent investor rule directs the trustee to invest based on risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust and instructs courts to review the prudence of individual investments not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole. The new prudent investor law thus abolishes all categorical restrictions on permissible types of investments. In so doing, the new law repudiates the old law's hostility to investment in stock. through 1997, we find that after a state's adoption of the new rule, trust institutions held
In an unpublished paper, Hankins et al. (2005) examine the effect of prudent trust investment laws on the preference for dividend-paying stocks among institutional investors such as insurance companies and bank trust departments. Based on SEC filings they find that, between 1990 and 2000, such institutions increased their holdings in non-dividend paying stocks after a state's adoption of the new prudent investor law. However, there are at least three potential problems with the Hankins et al. study. First, their sample data does not distinguish between personal trusts, ERISA benefit funds, and other such institutional funds. But state prudent trust investment law is directly controlling only with respect to personal trusts and only if the reporting institution is the trustee. Second, their identification strategy looks to the law of the institution's top-level holding company's state of incorporation, which is not necessarily the same state law that governs the administration of a trust fund held by a subsidiary of the holding company. Third, state principal and income rules, which bear directly on preferences for dividend-paying stocks, became increasingly differentiated after 1997 (see infra note 28 and text accompanying). But Hankins et al. do not control for changes in state principal and income rules. By contrast, our data isolates actively-managed personal trust funds from other institutional holdings, more closely aligns those funds with the applicable state law, and we exclude principal and income reform. Moreover, we use ERISA funds, which are governed by federal law (not state trust law), as a control group in some specifications.
Draft of January 15, 2007 50 Journal of Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) about 1.5 to 4.5 percentage points more stock at the expense of "safe" investments. This shift to stock amounts to a 3 to 10 percent increase in stock holdings and accounts for roughly 15 to 30 percent of the overall increase in stock holdings in the period under study. We attribute most of the remaining increase to stock market appreciation.
Even though trust investment laws are nominally default rules, we conclude that such rules matter in the presence of agency costs and unreliable judicial enforcement of opt outs. Moreover, by showing that trustees are sensitive to changes in trust fiduciary law, our findings imply that the fiduciary obligation is a viable means of trust governance. Our findings also bear on the appropriate measure of damages for breach of trust.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II motivates the empirical analysis by reviewing the law and economics of trust investment and the prior literature. Section III explains our research design, the nature of our dataset, and our identification strategies. Section IV reports our results. Section V, which concludes, flags various policy implications of our findings.
II. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF TRUST INVESTMENT A. Fiduciary Administration
A trust is a fiduciary relationship in which the trustee holds legal title to specified property, entrusted to him by the settlor, and manages that property for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries. Hence the trust separates risk-bearing (the beneficiaries) and management (the trustee) (Sitkoff 2004) . Draft of January 15, 2007 50 Journal of Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) To safeguard the beneficiary from mismanagement or misappropriation by the trustee, trust law supplies a set of default terms known as fiduciary duties that prescribe the trustee's level of care (the duty of prudence) and proscribe misappropriation (the duty of loyalty). Such terms are enforced through ex post litigation. Moreover, because trust default law makes it difficult for the beneficiary to remove the trustee, and because the beneficiary's interest is typically inalienable (for example, there is no market for trust control), the threat of fiduciary litigation is the primary force for minimizing agency costs in the modern trust relationship. 4 With respect to managing the trust's investment portfolio, unless the settlor provides otherwise, the trustee's fiduciary duty of prudence is defined by the default law of trust investment.
B. The Constrained Prudent Man Rule
After the South Sea Bubble burst in 1720, the English Court of Chancery developed a list of presumptively proper investments for trustees. These "legal lists," which were widely adopted in the United States, generally favored investment in government bonds and first mortgages, and proscribed investments in equity. Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) tion, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested." Nudged by the American Bankers Association, which sponsored a model statute codifying Armory, most states abandoned their legal lists for the prudent man rule.
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By the mid-twentieth century, however, the prudent man rule devolved into a highly constrained default. "Based on some degree of risk that was abstractly perceived as excessive, broad categories of investments and techniques often came to be classified as 'speculative' and thus as imprudent per se" (Restatement (Third) investing in "speculative" stock (defined to include stock in any company other than one "with regular earnings and paying regular dividends which may reasonably be expected to continue"), buying securities on margin, or buying discounted bonds was presumptively improper (Restatement (Second) of Trusts 1959, §227 cmts. f, m).
Moreover, judicial review of the trustee's investments operated ex post, inviting hindsight bias in the form of "post hoc searches for evidence that investments were too risky" (Rachlinski 2000, pp. 79-80) .
7 Thus, if a higher risk investment did not pay off, 6 The model prudent man rule statute and the role of the banking lobby is discussed in Langbein and Posner (1976, p. 5) and Shattuck (1951, pp. 499-504) . 7 In re Chamberlain's Estate (156 A. 42, 43 [1931] ), is an egregious example: "It was common knowledge, not only amongst bankers and trust companies, but the general public as well, that the stock market condition [in August 1929] was an unhealthy one, that values were very much inflated, and that a crash was almost sure to occur. In view of this fact, I think it was the duty of the executors to dispose of these stocks immediately upon their qualification as executors." Draft of January 15, 2007 50 Journal of Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) 8 the trustee faced potential liability for imprudently "speculating" in stock. Worse still, under the old law courts assessed the prudence of each investment in isolation rather than in the context of the portfolio as a whole, exposing the trustee to liability for a decline in the value of one stock even if that stock was part of a diversified portfolio that, taken as a whole, performed well.
At the same time, court decisions suggest that it was difficult to contract out of judicial scrutiny. Neither specific authorization in the trust instrument to make a particular investment 9 nor a broad exculpation clause insulated the trustee from judicial review (Dukeminier et al. 2005, pp. 540-43) . Not surprisingly, prior studies have found bank trust departments to be among the most conservative of institutional investors. v. Martin (425 So. 2d 415, 427 [1983] ), holding that investment in a set of underperforming stocks was imprudent "speculation" because the trustee had intended to sell them after appreciation). See also Rachlinski (2000, pp. 79-81) , collecting cases. 9 Even if the trust instrument gave the trustee such a power, the courts still assessed whether the trustee's exercise of the power was prudent under the circumstances. "An authorization by the terms of the trust to invest in a particular type of security does not mean that any investment in securities of that type is proper" (Restatement (Second) of Trusts 1959, §227 cmt. v) . Although a sound principle in theory-the existence of a power does not speak to the prudence of its exercise-in practice judicial review of the trustee's exercise of the power to make a particular investment was informed by the existing, constrained default rules. For example, in a well-known 1977 California decision, even though the trust instrument authorized every kind of investment "irrespective of whether said investments are in accordance with the laws then enforced in the State of California pertaining to the investment of trust funds," the court held the trustees liable for breach of the prudent man rule. "While the declaration of trust may possibly enlarge the prudent-investor standard as far as the Type of investment is concerned," explained the court, "it cannot be construed as permitting deviations from that standard in investigating the soundness of a specific investment." Estate of Collins (139 Cal.Rptr. 644, 646:650 [1977] ).
10 Based on SEC filings of institutional stock holdings prior to 1990 , Del Guercio (1996 concluded that bank trust departments were the most conservative institutional investors. Although Del Guercio did not exploit differences in state laws (few states adopted the new prudent investor rule during the period of her study), she attributed bank trust departments' relative conservatism to the prudent man rule. Using SEC filings from 1983 -1997 , Bennet et al. (2003 also examined differences in asset allocations across institutional investors, likewise finding that bank trust departments invested quite conservatively. Both Del Guercio and Bennett et al. base their analyses on SEC filings that detail the institution's aggregate investment profile, which likely includes not only personal trusts but also employee benefit and other funds. As such, their data is less refined than ours.
Taking a different approach, but reaching a similar result, Longstreth (1986) surveyed the 50 largest bank trust departments, college and university endowments, private foundations, and corporate pension Draft of January 15, 2007 50 Journal of Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) 
C. The Modern Prudent Investor Rule
In the latter part of the twentieth century, scholars and sophisticated practitioners familiar with modern portfolio theory (MPT) began calling for reform of the prudent man rule (see, for example, Gordon 1987; Langbein and Posner [1976, 1977] ; Longstreth 1986). As the critics rightly noted, risk is correlated with return and unsystematic risk can be diversified away. Assessing the prudence of a particular investment therefore requires consideration of the portfolio as a whole, the beneficiary's tolerance for risk, and the purpose of the trust. Critics also noted that investment in long-term, fixed-rate obligations with little default risk-the norm under the old prudent man rule-exposes the trust fund to considerable inflation risk.
In the mid to late 1980s a handful of states responded to the cogency of these criticisms by repealing the old prudent man rule in favor of a new prudent investor rule.
But widespread repeal of the old prudent man rule did not come until the early 1990s.
The deathblows to the old rule were two: (1) the 1992 Restatement (Third) of Trusts sections on prudent investment and (2) the 1994 Uniform Prudent Investor Act (hereinafter "UPIA"). Thanks in large part to the influence of the UPIA and the Restatement Third, today every state has repealed the old prudent man rule in favor of the modern prudent investor rule. 11 fund sponsors. Of the institutions replying, bank trust departments reported being most constrained by the legal standards governing their investment practices. 11 We treat any statute that instructs courts to evaluate the prudence of a particular investment in light of the composition of the trust portfolio as a whole as an adoption of the modern prudent investor rule even if the statute is not based on the Restatement or the UPIA. Appendix Table 1 details our dating of the modern prudent investor laws. The language of the UPIA is a bit more precise than some of the earlier statutes in that it expressly abolishes all categorical restrictions on investments, §2(e), and forbids hindsight review, §8. The Restatement and UPIA also consolidate the duty to diversify into the definition of prudence (see UPIA 1994, §3; Restatement (Third) (Langbein 1996, p. 644) , the Restatement might have affected portfolio design in states that were late to adopt the modern prudent investor rule. However, in unreported regressions we find that stock holdings in reform states increased even more relative to those in non-reform states after the Restatement Third was promulgated, and in some specifications we did not detect any additional effect of the Restatement. Therefore, even if the new Restatement affected portfolio allocations, the prudent investor rule statutes nonetheless had a significant independent effect. Indeed, we suspect that the Restatement may have enhanced relative differences between reform and non-reform states by providing commentary that substituted for a body of interpretive case law.
12 See 29 C.F.R. §2550.404a-1(b)(1)(i), interpreting ERISA §404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1)(B). The official commentary to the regulation explains: "The 'prudence' rule in the Act sets forth a standard built upon, but that should and does depart from, traditional trust law in certain respects. The Department is of the opinion that (1) generally, the relative riskiness of a specific investment or investment course of action does not render such investment or investment course of action either per se prudent or per se imprudent, and (2) the prudence of an investment decision should not be judged without regard to the role that the proposed investment or investment course of action plays within the overall plan portfolio" (44 Fed. Reg. 37,221 Jun. 26, 1979, p. 37,222) . 13 See, for example, Laborers National Pension Fund v. Northern Trust Quantitative Advisors, (173 F.3d 313, 322 [1999] ) (reversing the district court for reviewing the investment in question "in isolation under the common law trust standard, instead of according to the modern portfolio theory required by ER-ISA policy as expressed by the Secretary's regulations"). On the other hand, some scholars have argued that trustees operating under ERISA nonetheless have invested cautiously in part because the large size of ERISA funds creates a significant liability exposure (see Del Guercio 1996, p.36) . See also Longstreth (1986, p. 35) . In a related vein, Brav and Heaton (1998) have argued that employee benefit funds tend to favor dividend-paying stocks, widely regarded as safer investments, and this may explain the relative underperformance of non-dividend paying stocks.
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D. Does Default Trust Investment Law Matter?
As reformulated (and made gender-neutral), the new prudent investor rule provides that the "trustee's investment and management decisions respecting individual assets are evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust" (UPIA 1994, §2).
14 Like the old law, the new law is nominally a default rule that may be altered by the terms of the trust (UPIA 1994, §1(b) . feasible, which is to say that trust agreements are necessarily incomplete contracts and hence default fiduciary rules remain relevant. Second, under the old law courts were skeptical of opt outs. For example, even if the trust instrument authorized a specific investment, courts still reviewed whether exercising that authority was prudent under the circumstances.
17 Third, the trustee's litigation risk was asymmetric. Under the old law the beneficiary had no viable cause of action for a too-conservative portfolio (government bonds were in effect per se prudent). 18 At the same time, if an investment in stock did not pay off, in hindsight courts often deemed such an investment to have been imprudent "speculation" regardless of whether it was a sensible investment ex ante in the context of the portfolio as a whole. 19 Finally, typical industry compensation arrangements, which are based on the total corpus of the trust and are roughly one percent or less per annum, did not offset the trustee's asymmetric litigation risk.
20
Draft of January 15, 2007 50 Journal of Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) In general, the new law applies prospectively to existing trusts (see UPIA 1994, §11). Thus, after adoption the new rule applies to all the trustee's subsequent investment decisions, including the failure within a "reasonable time" to reallocate a portfolio that was crafted to comply with the prior law (see UPIA 1994, §4; Restatement (Third) of Trusts 1992, §229). Indeed, we are told that after local enactment of the new rule it was common for bank trust departments to undertake a systematic review of the investment profile of the bank's existing book of business to assess each account's compliance with the new law.
On the other hand, compliance with the modern prudent investor rule will not always require a portfolio reallocation. The risk tolerance of the beneficiaries may require a conservative investment strategy-visualize the paradigmatic trust for the benefit of a widow and orphans. 21 Further, the new law does not require immediate reallocation if the benefits of doing so are outweighed by the attendant tax and other transaction costs (see UPIA 1994, §4; Restatement (Third) of Trusts 1992, §229). Accordingly, the extent to which adoption of the new prudent investor rule prompts greater investment in equity will be a function of the risk tolerance of the beneficiaries of the trusts in our sample, the transaction costs of portfolio reallocation and the meaning of "reasonable time," and the extent to which settlors had been able successfully to opt out of the prior law. 21 As the official comment to UPIA 1994, §2 explains, "tolerance for risk varies greatly with . . . the purposes of the trust and the relevant circumstances of the beneficiaries. A trust whose main purpose is to support an elderly widow of modest means will have a lower risk tolerance than a trust to accumulate for a young scion of great wealth." Since 2001, the FDIC has published those reports and has made bank-level data available online. 22 The FDIC provided us with a CD-ROM of bank-level data from 1986 to 2000.
The trust holdings of regulated institutions are reported in categories entitled "Employee Benefit Trusts," 23 "Personal Trusts," and "Estates." The "Personal Trusts"
category includes private and charitable trusts, 24 both inter vivos and testamentary, but
Draft of January 15, 2007 50 Journal of Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) excludes commercial trusts and employee benefit plans. Reporting institutions state their holdings as of December 31 of the reporting year. We therefore code all adoptions of the new prudent investor rule as taking place in the year the legislation took effect (see Appendix Table 1 ). The asset allocation of trust holdings is broken down among the following categories: (1) stock (common and preferred combined); 25 (2) interest-bearing accounts; (3) U.S. treasuries; (4) local government bonds; (5) money-market funds; (6) other short-term obligations (mainly commercial paper); (7) other bonds; (8) mortgages;
(9) real estate; and (10) miscellaneous. 26 "Other bonds" includes corporate and foreign government obligations and "real estate" includes a variety of real estate investments.
Although the data are available from 1986 through 2004, we examine only the years 1986 through 1997 for three reasons. First, the data are reported by state of the reporting institution's charter. Prior to 1997, interstate banks tended to operate as bank holding companies (which the Federal Reserved designates as the "high holder") with separately-chartered and hence separately-reporting banks in different states. 27 Although there is flexibility in the choice-of-law rules, the applicable fiduciary law is typically the law of the trustee's state of residence (see Sitkoff and Schanzenbach, 2005, pp. 374-75) .
Accordingly, our coding of Prudent Investor should capture the law applicable to the reported assets.
25 Shares of mutual funds are reported as stock holdings. See infra note __.
26 A final category, "non-interest bearing accounts" was typically quite small (less than .1% on average and usually zero) and probably serves an accounting and beneficiary payment function. 27 Banks could maintain interstate branches under narrow circumstances prior to 1997, but a study conducted by the Federal Reserve found that few banks did so (see McLaughlin 1995) .
Draft of January 15, 2007 50 Journal of Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) Beginning in 1997, however, the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 authorized banks and bank holding companies to convert independently chartered banks in other states into branch offices of a single interstate bank (Pub. L. No. 103-328, U.S.C.C.A.N. 1994 , p. 2338 Mulloy and Lasker 1995) . Because the data are collected by institution and then aggregated to the state level by state of the reporting institution's charter, the interstate bank mergers and branching allowed by the Riegle-Neal Act has the potential to bias our results by changing the state in which assets are reported without a corresponding change in governing law.
Second, after 1997 many states reformed their principal and income rules. These reforms could affect trust asset allocation directly because they made less rigid the formal distinction between capital gains and income. 28 Prior to 1997, principal and income rules were for the most part uniform across the states.
Third, as a result of the jurisdictional competition for trust funds, state laws concerning the Rule Against Perpetuities and self-settled asset protection trusts became significantly differentiated beginning in 1997. 29 Although these changes do not bear directly on trust investment law, they nonetheless have the potential to affect trust invest-Draft of January 15, 2007 50 Journal of Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) ment practice. Perpetual trusts and self-settled asset protection trusts have a different timeframe and purpose that might warrant heavier investment in equities.
30 Figure 1 illustrates the geographic and temporal variation in the prudent investor rule's pattern of adoptions through 1997, the period under study. As can be seen, there is substantial variation across regions and over time. Given the distribution of adoptions over time, if stock-preferring trusts changed states to take advantage of the new rule, our before-and-after analysis might yield biased estimates. For at least three reasons, however, we think that this is unlikely. First, it is difficult for an existing trust to change its situs without judicial approval. Second, in contrast to perpetuities, asset protection, and taxes, there is no practitioner or other literature indicating that prudent trust investment laws influenced initial choice or subsequent 30 See id. at 385-87. Regressions on the full sample tended to decrease the coefficient estimates a bit, but the results remained statistically significant. Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) change of jurisdiction (see Sitkoff and Schanzenbach 2005, pp. 378-79 n.71) . Third, as discussed below, we test the effect of early versus later adoptions and find that later adoptions had a stronger effect, which implies no early movement by stock-preferring trusts.
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B. Identification Strategies
We focus on two dependent variables: (1) the percentage of personal trust funds invested in stock (%Stock PT ) and (2) the difference between the percentage of personal trust funds held as stock and the percentage of employee benefit funds held as stock (%Stock PT -%Stock EB ).
Percent Stock
The data do not detail individual stock, bond, and real estate holdings, but rather aggregate holdings within each category. Percent aggregate stock holdings in personal trusts is, however, an important outcome variable in its own right for at least three reasons. 31 First, the old prudent man rule disfavored broad classes of equity holdings. Thus, if the prior law constrained trust portfolio asset allocation, we would expect to see reallocation toward equity after adoption of the new law. Second, the new law for the first time exposes the trustee to real litigation risk from too much caution. Third, increased stock holdings at the expense of government bonds and other investments with little to no default risk imply higher risk portfolios. Indeed, we show that the increase in stock hold- 31 Ideally, we would use Beta or some other measure of risk (such as variance of portfolio returns across different states), but such measures require individual account data, which is not available. Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) ings after adoption of the new law came largely at the expense of favored "safe" investments such as government bonds.
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Our state-level specification is a straightforward differences-in-differences regression using state fixed effects:
Where α is a constant, j indexes state, and t indexes year. PI or Prudent Investor equals one in a state that has the new prudent investor rule.
In our bank-level analysis, we control for both state and bank fixed effects. For our bank fixed effects, we include in the regression a dummy at the level of the bank's top-level holding company (i.e., the institution that the Federal Reserve designates as the bank's "high holder"). Sometimes there is no entity apart from the chartered institution, in which case the high-holder is the bank itself. However, most banks in the sample are wholly owned by a holding company. Banks owned by the same "high holder" may share a common investment philosophy, operations manuals, and institutional culture.
32 Reported stock holdings also include shares in certain mutual funds (but not municipal bond funds or money market mutual funds, which are reported as local government bonds and money market funds respectively). To the extent that shares in mutual funds are reported as stock even if the underlying mutual fund is invested in bonds, the percent stock variable might be overstated. This potential overstatement is not a concern, however, for several reasons. First, most of the year-to-year variation in the percent stock variable can be explained by stock market movements, which strongly implies that the investments reported as stock are indeed comprised mainly of stock. Second, in the period under study mutual funds moved aggressively into corporate bonds, foreign government bonds, and high-yield bonds, holding more in those categories than U.S. government bonds by the mid-1990s (Investment Company Fact Book 2006, p. 74) . As compared to U.S. government bonds, these bonds are associated with a greater risk of default and exchange-rate risk. Hence an increase in the percent stock variable attributable to mutual fund holdings would still imply a riskier portfolio. Third, in unreported regressions we combined the separately reported corporate bonds category with stock holdings and found slightly stronger effects, which implies that we have not conflated a movement from corporate bonds to corporate bond mutual funds with an increase in stock holdings (regressions on "other bonds" alone showed a weak positive effect of the reform). where i indexes bank and h indexes high holder. HighHolder are bank holding company fixed effects. In this regression the PI coefficient is identified by variation within bank holding companies that own reporting institutions in multiple states. We thus simultaneously control for state and institution fixed effects.
Because our dependent variable is a percentage, OLS regressions may not be ideal.
34
Following the suggestion of Wooldridge and Papke (1996), we report a specification in which we exponentiate the right hand side and report odds-ratios.
35
33 First, the fitted values of the regressions may lie outside the 0 to 100 range, and it is not clear how to interpret such a result. In the state-level regressions, all fitted values for all regressions lie between 0 and 100 (in fact, they are generally between 25% and 75%). In the bank-level regressions, however, between 100 and 150 fitted values were negative (albeit in a sample of nearly 23,000). None exceeded 100. Second, the linear form of the OLS regression imposes a functional form that must be incorrect. The effect of a continuous right hand side variable tends to dissipate as it gets very large or very small because the effect must get smaller as the fitted value gets closer to the endpoints, 0 or 100.
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We condition on two additional independent variables in most specifications: (1) log of the high holder's assets and (2) percent of the high holder's employee benefit funds invested in stock. The first variable is positively correlated with stock investment in most specifications. Banks with relatively greater aggregate trust assets may experience economies of scale in trading securities and in obtaining expert investment advice.
We use log assets of the high holder because a small bank owned by a larger institution should be more like the large institution than a small, independent bank (although using log assets at the bank level made little difference to the results). In the corresponding specifications for the state-level regressions, we use log total state assets.
The second independent variable, percent of employee benefit funds invested in stock, helps to control for changes in institutional preferences for equity. Institution fixed effects are inadequate to account for differences between institutions if preferences for debt and equity changed within an institution over time or management was replaced.
36
Employee benefit trusts may be a suitable control. First, the investment of such trusts is governed by federal law under ERISA, not state prudent investor laws, and ERISA preempts inconsistent state law. Hence, the portfolio allocation of ERISA funds should be less sensitive than that of personal trusts to changes in state prudent trust investment 34 The transformation requires estimation by non-linear least squares, and was performed using Stata's GLM command taking the "family" as binomial and the "link" as logistic. The estimation equation takes the form: E(Y|X)=exp(X'B)/(1+exp(X'B)) which constrains the fitted values of Y to be between 0 and 1. 35 Another popular transformation is the logistic. This transformation is performed on the dependent variable, however, and there is no clear procedure for how to do so in the presence of zero values. 36 To the extent that changing investment norms led to a general movement to stocks, such a trend would tend to work against our finding that the new prudent investor rule prompted an increase in trust investment in stock. Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) laws. Second, changes in bank management or investment norms within the institution should affect personal trust and employee benefit trust funds similarly. Accordingly, controlling for the institution's or the state's percentage holdings in stock in employee benefit funds may remove an important part of the error term. As with institutional assets, we control for %Stock EB on the high holder's level on the theory that the preferences we are attempting to capture are those of the controlling institution.
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The period under study also experienced a significant increase in stock prices, with the S&P 500 nearly tripling between 1990 and 1997. If there is investor inertia, stock price appreciation has the potential to bias to our results upward if a state's propensity to have high stock holdings is correlated with the policy change. In addition, investor inertia and stock price appreciation may exacerbate problems of serial correlation.
Under three simplifying assumptions, however, we may remove the increase in percent stock attributable to stock market appreciation. First, we assume that income in the form of interest and cash dividends is largely paid to out to the beneficiaries. Most trusts have an income beneficiary and there are significant federal income tax incentives not to retain such income in trust (see McGovern and Kurtz 2004, p. 705 §15.5) . Second, we assume that the value of all non-stock investments does not change. This assumption will tend to exaggerate the effect of increases in stock prices, because it does not account for the counter effect of increases in the value of other investments. 37 Third, we assume that the increase in the average portfolio is the same as the increase in the S&P 500. Un-37 For example, bond prices increased over the course of the 1990s. Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) der these assumptions, we difference out the increase in percentage stock holdings year to year.
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Employee Benefits Control Group
In a second set of regressions, we use employee benefit funds as a control group by taking %Stock PT -%Stock EB as our dependent variable. Using employee benefit funds as a control group has a number of advantages. In the bank-level specifications, it eliminates the problem encountered when banks report no stock holdings, discussed below.
Although the values of the dependent variable are constrained to be between -100 and 100, all fitted values in all specifications are well within this range. In addition, simply controlling for %Stock EB as a right-hand side variable does not account for a divergence between the two variables over time. As discussed below, we find strong time trends in employee benefit portfolio allocations. By contrast, taking the difference %Stock PT%Stock EB conditional on state and year dummies removes both (1) the strong time trends that were common to both variables (including the possible effect of the Restatement) and (2) state-specific differences, and it does so without the addition of many new interaction terms. In sum, taking the difference between the two should remove all fixed and time-varying error common to both variables.
In the ERISA control group specifications the coefficient on PI is interpreted as the change in the difference between the percentage stock in personal trusts and employee benefit funds after adoption of the new law. The result is thus similar to a firstdifference regression, assuming that asset allocation in employee benefit funds is an ap- 
IV. RESULTS
A. Percent Stock in Personal Trusts
Figures 2 and 3 trace the percent stock (%Stock) and percent safe (%Safe) investments in personal trusts by reform status and year using the state-level data. Consistent with the old prudent man rule, we define "safe" investments to include federal, state, and municipal bonds, interest-bearing bank accounts, money market funds, and mortgages.
40
Taken together, Figures 2 and 3 suggest that trusts in the states that adopted the new pru-39 Even if the bank does not hold employee benefit funds, the highholder may through other banks. 40 The remaining investment categories "other bonds," "real estate," and "short-term obligations" varied substantially over the period and resist classification as "risky" or "safe." Investments in these categories typically amounted to less than 10% of the average portfolio. Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) dent investor rule held more stock (on the order of 1-4% depending on the year) at the expense of "safe" investments. 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Year Reform States Non-Reform States 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Year Reform States Non-Reform States Years Pre-and Post-Reform Stock Safe Tables 1 and 2 correspond to Equations 1 and 2, presenting the results for %Stock using state-level and bank-level data respectively. Each table presents the basic model and a number of alternate specifications as checks for robustness and corrections for possible bias caused by serial correlation in the error terms. Table 1 demonstrates a consistent, statistically significant effect from adopting the new prudent investor rule. In Model 1, the most basic model, the percentage of stock held in the average trust fund increases by 1.72 percentage points after the reform. In
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Model 2, which further conditions on log total state assets and the percentage of assets held as stock in employee benefit funds, the coefficient on Prudent Investor increases slightly to 2.11 and is more precisely estimated. To put these coefficients in perspective, in the period under study the average state held 47% of its personal trust assets in stock Draft of January 15, 2007 50 Journal of Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) and average state stock holdings increased roughly 14 percentage points between the late 1980s and mid 1990s. Hence, taking the coefficient of 2.11 at face value, our results imply that adoption of the new prudent investor rule explains about 15 percent of the 14 point increase.
To confirm that these increases were coming at the expense of investments favored by the rule rather than corporate bonds and real estate, in unreported regressions we took %Safe as our dependent variable, defining "safe" as before. The results mirrored those of the %Stock regressions, with similar but oppositely signed coefficients, implying a roughly one-for-one tradeoff of safe for stock. For example, in the %Safe regression based on Model 2, the coefficient on Prudent Investor was -2.02 and was significant at the 1 percent level. Accordingly, we conclude that the increase in stock came entirely at the expense of investments with little to no default risk, the sort of investments that the old prudent man rule had favored.
Given the uncertainty associated with new legal rules and the law's requirement to consider tax and other transaction costs of portfolio reallocation, the effect of the reform may not be a discrete jump in stock holdings.
42 Indeed, Figure 4 indicates that the effect of reform may have increased over time. Model 3 divides the reform into two periods: 0-2 years since reform and 3 years or more since reform. In addition, to test explicitly for the presence of a biasing trend, we include a dummy variable for the three years prior to reform. The results are consistent with Figure 4 . There is no change in 42 The new prudent investor rule requires reallocation to bring the trust portfolio into compliance with the new law within "a reasonable time" (see UPIA §4; Restatement (Third) of Trusts 1992, §229). Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) stock holdings in the years prior to reform, and the effect of reform may increase slightly after the first three years.
Draft of
Model 4 weights the data by total state assets for a picture of the national average.
In this specification the coefficient is cut in half and is significant at just over the 5% level. However, Model 5 splits the weighted regression of Model 4 into the same time periods as Model 3, and the effect of the reform three years out or more is strongly significant and large (coefficient of 3.37), while the effect during the first three years is insignificant and small (coefficient of .6). Thus, the weighted regressions also suggest a large, if somewhat delayed, effect.
In addition to tax and other transaction costs that might justify a slower reallocation after enactment of the new rule, the larger effect of the reform over time may also stem from the fact of early enactments prior to the new Restatement by states with substantial trust assets such as California and Delaware. In unreported regressions, we allowed separate effects before and after the adoption of the Restatement. In these regressions the reform had a larger effect post-Restatement. However, the larger effect postRestatement was not evident in the %Stock PT -%Stock EB specifications, which may control better for contemporaneous changes, so we do not draw any firm conclusions.
A potentially serious concern in differences-in-differences studies is the presence of serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004) , particularly with financial variables (especially if investment patterns are persistent). Models 6, 7, and 8 take various approaches to deal with the problem. Model 6 adds state-specific time trends, and the coefficient on Prudent Investor decreases to 1.71 but remains significant at the 5% level. Model 7 clusters the standard errors at the state level. The standard error increases Draft of January 15, 2007 50 Journal of Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) from .62 to .86, but the coefficient is unchanged from Model 2 and remains significant with a p-value of .02.
In Model 8 we examine the effect of the reform after netting out the increase in percentage stock that would result from a static portfolio allocation and appreciation in stock prices by taking "Net Percentage Stock" as the dependent variable. The impact of the new prudent investor rule remains about 2.0 percentage points. Thus, our previous results hold even with our rough and noisy method of removing appreciation bias. In addition, the year effects diminish (or, early on, are negative) and no longer indicate a trend during the 1990s (the year effect for 1997 is indistinguishable from 1987, the excluded year). Accordingly, we attribute the remainder of the increase in stock holdings to stock market appreciation and investment inertia.
Finally, Model 9 presents the results using the exponential transformation of the right hand side variables. The odds ratio on Prudent Investor is 1.094 and is significant at less than the 1% level, indicating that the percent of trust assets held as stock increased after the reform. Taking all other variables at their means, the odds ratio implies an increase in stock holdings of roughly 2.5 percentage points, a slightly larger result than in our OLS estimates Table 2 presents the results using the specification of Equation 2. All standard errors reflect clustering by state. Model 1 uses the full sample. The coefficient on Prudent Investor is small and insignificant, and the estimated coefficient on Prudent Investor is very close to zero.
One problem with the bank-level data is that many banks have few assets in personal trust accounts. In the period under study, 19% of bank-year observations for per-Draft of January 15, 2007 50 Journal of Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) sonal trust funds report no stock being held in such funds. Much of this seemingly strange result is attributable to banks with few trust assets. In the sample years 1986-1997, more than one-fourth of the bank-year observations report $1 million or less in personal trust assets, and 45% of this subset reports holding no stock. These small sums may represent only a few accounts, which can greatly distort the bank's reported asset allocation. Among banks with trust assets over $1 million, only 7% of bank-year observations report no stock holdings. A large number of zero stock holdings creates censoring problems and small banks, whose asset holding could swing wildly, probably add a lot of noise to the data.
Model 2 restricts the sample to banks that also report employee benefit funds and controls for %Stock EB . In this subsample, 8% of the bank-year observations report holding no stock, reducing concerns about the data being censored at zero. 43 The coefficient on Prudent Investor increases to .9, but is still not statistically significant. Weighting the data reduces the influence of low-asset banks, and it increases the coefficient a bit in Model 3, though again the coefficient is not statistically significant.
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The results are statistically significant when state-specific trends are included in the OLS regression in Model 4 and in the transformation in Model 5. The odds-ratio in Model 5 is 1.076, which is quite close to that of the state-level result of 1.094, and implies a roughly 2.0 percentage points increase in stock holdings after reform. 43 Excluding those trust institutions whose high holder did not have employee trust funds drops only about five percent of total trust assets. 44 Unreported regressions restricting the sample to larger banks or only banks with employee benefit funds yielded results close to those of Model 1. The coefficient increases appreciably only when we condition on %Stock EB . Draft of January 15, 2007 50 Journal of Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) In sum, the state-level OLS regressions suggest that the percentage of personal trust funds invested in stock increased between 1.5 and 2.1 percentage points after adoption of the new prudent investor rule, with a slight increase in later years. The transformed results imply a 2 to 2.5 percentage points increase in stock holdings after the reform. In the period under study, the average state held 47% of its personal trust assets in stock. Accordingly, these results suggest a modest increase in trust investment in stock post-reform. 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Year Reform States Non-Reform States Years Pre-and Post-Reform
B. Percent Stock in Personal Trust
Draft of January 15, 2007 50 Journal of Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) In sum, the state-level regressions suggest that the difference between the percentage of stock holdings in personal trust funds and employee benefit funds was 3 to 4 points larger after adoption of the new prudent investor rule.
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The bank-level regressions reported in Table 4 tell roughly the same story and, unlike before, consistently confirm the state-level estimates. When the data are weighted by bank assets in Model 2, the coefficient on Prudent Investor is 4.45 (with a p-value of .059). This result is nearly identical to the coefficient of 4.34 estimated in Model 1 of Table 3 , and it is not greatly different from the coefficient of 2.88 estimated using data weighted by state assets in Model 2 of Table 3 . 45 To put these results in context, in 1986 personal trusts in the average state held 4 percentage points more in stock than was held in employee benefit funds (42% versus 38%). We interpret the coefficient of 4.3 on Prudent Investor and the coefficient of roughly -5.5 on the later year dummies to imply that the differential remained nearly constant in states that adopted the new prudent investor rule but disappeared in states that did not adopt the reform. These results are consistent with the trends depicted in Figure 6 . Draft of January 15, 2007 50 Journal of Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) V. CONCLUSION The results of our empirical analysis demonstrate that changes in the default rules of prudent trust investing affected portfolio allocation in noncommercial trusts held by institutional trustees. Depending on the approach taken, the point estimates imply that stock holdings increased between 1.5 and 4.5 percentage points-an increase of 3 to 10 percent-after the adoption of the new prudent investor rule. Our findings, which endure across a variety of identification strategies and numerous robustness checks, explain roughly 15 to 30 percent of the overall increase in stock holdings in the period under study. We attribute most of the remaining increase to stock market appreciation and investor inertia.
Assuming that 2 percentage points more of personal trust funds were invested in stock as of 1997, a year when reported personal trust assets totaled nearly $750 billion, roughly $15 billion more was invested in stock than otherwise would have been. This result is even more impressive when one considers that (a) for many trusts the new law will not require a reallocation (the inframarginal trusts) and (b) the new law only requires the trustee of a non-complying trust to reallocate the trust portfolio within a "reasonable time" given the tax and other transaction costs of reallocation. Hence, that there is any observable effect implies that the default rules of trust investment law, and the switch to the modern prudent investor standard, has had a profound influence.
Further, because our data includes only a subset of the full population of trust funds, this $15 billion back-of-the-envelope calculation represents a lower bound. Indeed, there is good reason to suppose that trust funds held by federally-reporting institu-Draft of January 15, 2007 50 Journal of Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) tional trustees are less sensitive to changes in the default rules of prudent trust investing than other trusts. Institutional trustees tend to have access to competent legal counsel and standard form trust agreements with well-drafted opt-out provisions.
Our findings have at least six important policy implications, three concerning doctrine and three concerning theory. First, increasing trust investment in stocks supports the Restatement's and UPIA's allied reform of consolidating the duty to diversify into the definition of prudence.
46 Not all the states that have adopted the total-portfolio approach of the new prudent investor rule, however, have adopted an explicit duty to diversify (particularly the states that did not adopt the uniform act). Second, the growing importance of stocks, caused in part by legal changes, lends support to the current effort to reform the principal and income rules by making less rigid the arcane formal distinction between capital gains and income.
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Third, the increasing role of stock investment supports a total return measure of damages for breach of trust. The total return measure is based on the difference in value between the imprudently managed trust and a hypothetical, prudent portfolio. The traditional approach, by contrast, is to measure damages by reference to the amount of the trust fund on the date that it was last prudently invested plus interest (sometimes but not always compounded) at a rate set by the trial court (Dukeminier et al. 2005, pp. 817-18 Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) the total return measure more closely fits the underlying remedial aim of putting the beneficiaries in the position that they would have been in but for the breach. 49 Fourth, the results demonstrate that default rules matter in the presence of agency costs and unreliable judicial enforcement of opt outs. The importance of this conclusion is brought more sharply into focus when one considers that the federally-reporting institutional trustees in our sample are likely among the most sophisticated of trustees (in 2004 the average account size in our sample was $1 million), with ready access to competent legal counsel and trust agreement forms with well-drafted opt-out boilerplate. Nonetheless, even for this group, the default rule remained relevant.
Fifth, contrary to economic and empirical analysis of fiduciary litigation in corporate law (see Romano 1991), but consistent with prior economic analysis of fiduciary litigation in trust law (see Sitkoff 2003 Sitkoff , 2004 , our results imply that fiduciary law is a potentially viable means of governance in trust law-and the threat of fiduciary litigation is the primary force for minimizing agency costs in the modern trust relationship. Prior to this study, there was no empirical analysis of whether trustees are in fact sensitive to changes in their potential liability exposure under trust fiduciary law.
Finally, we believe that adoption of the new prudent investor rule was a positive change for settlors, trustees, beneficiaries. The agency problems in trust law, together with trustee compensation schemes, rigid doctrine, and hindsight bias, combined to make bank trust departments notoriously conservative. Although heavy investment in government bonds avoids default risk, it exposes the trust to considerable inflation risk. By con- 49 Total return damages are endorsed in Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule 1992, §205, and are defended by Halbach (1992, pp. 458-59) and Sitkoff (2003, pp. 584-87) .
Draft of January 15, 2007 50 Journal of Law and Economics ___ (forthcoming 2007) trast, the new rule's emphasis on portfolio-wide risk and return directs trustees to invest more aggressively for those who have a high risk tolerance and more conservatively for those with a low risk tolerance, and in all cases the trustee must consider both default and inflation risk in crafting the trust portfolio. 
